How does Vardar connect without adding inline control risk?

Vardar begins with a read-only copy of traffic from SPAN or TAP and can add customer-approved read-only evidence sources. Active integrations remain explicitly governed by customer policy and approval.

Does raw OT data leave the site?

The Vardar Edge AI appliance performs decoding, correlation, inference and investigation locally. Raw OT traffic and process values remain inside the customer environment.

How does Vardar reduce false positives?

Vardar compares two evidence paths: network behavior and process or physics behavior. Agreement raises confidence; a single evidence path stays under investigation instead of being presented as confirmed cyber.

Attack #6, AIT202 (SWaT 2015)

1.0Plant

Where it hit the plant

raw water intake

chemical dosing

AIT202

ultrafiltration

dechlorination / UV

reverse osmosis

permeate transfer & backwash

2.0Timeline

Attack window and detections

Labelled window2015-12-28 12:00:55 to 2015-12-28 12:04:10plant local time

Physical Residual

instant

Temporal Sequence

instant

Process Invariants

no flag

Fused Ensemble

instant

Shaded band: the labelled attack window from the iTrust ground-truth catalog. Marks: the first second each engine flagged the window. "No flag" means the engine stayed silent for the whole window.

3.0Evidence

Why it was flagged

At 2015-12-28 12:00:55, attack #6 (SSSP) manipulated AIT202 — “Set value of AIT-202 as 6”. The serving model raised the alert immediately — within the first second of the attack (peak score 8.8172x the operating threshold). The dominant physical evidence: P203 — HCl chemical dosing pump, Stage 2 (chemical dosing) was driven to a state the plant's learned physics did not predict from the rest of the process, carrying 39% of the anomaly score — 27.4x its share in normal operation. Supporting deviations were concentrated in P205, AIT202, AIT201. In plain terms: the plant's own physics stopped agreeing with what the sensors were reporting, in exactly the part of the process the attacker touched.
From the official explain run 2026-06-12T06:42:56Z

Single channelPeak score 8.82x of the operating thresholdFused peak 1.00x of the operating threshold

Sensors carrying the anomaly score

Sensor	Share of score	Deviation	Share vs normal
P203 HCl chemical dosing pump, Stage 2 (chemical dosing)	38.9%	133.9σ	27.4x
P205 NaOCl chemical dosing pump, Stage 2 (chemical dosing)	38.0%	130.8σ	25.0x
AIT202 pH analyzer (HCl dosing control), Stage 2 (chemical dosing)	7.3%	25.0σ	1.5x
AIT201 conductivity analyzer (NaCl dosing control), Stage 2 (chemical dosing)	5.5%	18.8σ	1.2x
AIT203 ORP analyzer (NaOCl dosing control), Stage 2 (chemical dosing)	2.0%	6.9σ	0.5x
P201 NaCl chemical dosing pump, Stage 2 (chemical dosing)	1.2%	4.1σ	0.2x
AIT501 RO feed pH analyzer, Stage 5 (reverse osmosis)	1.1%	3.8σ	0.3x
LIT101 raw water tank level transmitter, Stage 1 (raw water intake)	1.0%	3.3σ	0.2x

4.0Provenance

Every figure has a run.

Validation run

2026-06-11T22:34:18Z, commit 97752838a3f3d5271b7e43335fcf1f839fdf057a

Model image

sha-97752838a3f3

Metrics artefact SHA-256

80c98149b000d88af3fc7b58ab407a24c81f3839426e7d4e53c2011bbf15c52a

Explain run

2026-06-12T06:42:56Z

Explain artefact SHA-256

2616f67199c281fc558b4b05e3cccdeb223910e4c07addf0c80bc50f0ec5b333

Generator

vardar-portal/scripts/build-gallery-data.mjs (DEL-34/DEL-43)

SWaT and WaDi datasets courtesy of iTrust, Centre for Research in Cyber Security, Singapore University of Technology and Design. Detection figures trace to the reproducible model runs shown with each dataset.

More caught attacks from SWaT 2015Attack #28 Attack #22 Attack #37 Attack #20 All caught attacks

The next record is your process.

A technical evaluation on one critical process, with success criteria agreed in advance, produces the only figure that applies to your site.

Evaluate one critical process

Attack #6AIT202

Sensors carrying the anomaly score

The next record is your process.