All caught attacksAttack walkthrough / evidence trace / WaDi 2017

Attack #21FIT001

Primary-grid inlet flow meter (chemical-dosing line). Attacker's intended impact: No increase in level in primary grid.

Single Stage, Single PointWater Distribution9m 55s windowfirst catch 2m 59s1 of 1 engines flagged it
1.0Plant

Where it hit the plant

P1

primary grid, raw-water intake & dosing

1FIT001
P2

elevated reservoir, secondary distribution

P3

consumer / return network

2.0Timeline

Attack window and detections

Labelled window2017-10-10 10:24:10 to 2017-10-10 10:34:00plant local time
Physical Residual
2m 59s

Shaded band: the labelled attack window from the iTrust ground-truth catalog. Marks: the first second each engine flagged the window. "No flag" means the engine stayed silent for the whole window.

3.0Evidence

Why it was flagged

At 2017-10-10 10:24:10, attack #2 (SSSP) manipulated 1FIT001 — “Chemical dosing pumps start (increase of chemical dosing)”. The serving model raised the alert 179 seconds after onset (peak score 2.649x the operating threshold). The dominant physical evidence: 1MV001 — primary-grid raw-water inlet motorized valve, Stage 1 (primary grid — raw-water intake & dosing) was driven to a state the plant's learned physics did not predict from the rest of the process, carrying 15% of the anomaly score — 32.1x its share in normal operation. Supporting deviations were concentrated in 1FIT001, 2LS401, 1P001. In plain terms: the plant's own physics stopped agreeing with what the sensors were reporting, in exactly the part of the process the attacker touched.

From the official explain run 2026-06-14T18:37:06Z
Peak score 2.65x of the operating threshold

Sensors carrying the anomaly score

SensorShare of scoreDeviationShare vs normal
1MV001
primary-grid raw-water inlet motorized valve, Stage 1 (primary grid — raw-water intake & dosing)
14.6%13.8σ32.1x
1FIT001
primary-grid inlet flow meter (chemical-dosing line), Stage 1 (primary grid — raw-water intake & dosing)
10.9%10.4σ16.2x
2LS401
level switch, Stage 2 (elevated reservoir — secondary distribution)
6.7%6.1σ10.2x
1P001
raw-water transfer pump P1, Stage 1 (primary grid — raw-water intake & dosing)
5.6%8.3σ49.9x
1P003
chemical-dosing pump P3, Stage 1 (primary grid — raw-water intake & dosing)
5.5%8.2σ34.5x
2LS101
level switch, Stage 2 (elevated reservoir — secondary distribution)
5.3%5.0σ8.4x
1MV004
motorized valve, Stage 1 (primary grid — raw-water intake & dosing)
5.1%4.7σ2.3x
2MCV601
motorized control valve, Stage 2 (elevated reservoir — secondary distribution)
3.0%3.2σ2.6x
4.0Provenance

Every figure has a run.

Validation run

2026-06-13T22:27:18Z, commit de79dac5398150de9bc5eda89a529d2dbb942c6c

Model image

sha-de79dac53981

Metrics artefact SHA-256

a05be50d6a12ad442d292f0b9759d4087430c537fcc3b93712812ff55d5605bb

Explain run

2026-06-14T18:37:06Z

Explain artefact SHA-256

ce5f77ae0bc78a0576ec3ca053b5594844039f7f77c0aa2ba63850a9bf46874f

Generator

vardar-portal/scripts/build-gallery-data.mjs (DEL-34/DEL-43)

SWaT and WaDi datasets courtesy of iTrust, Centre for Research in Cyber Security, Singapore University of Technology and Design. Detection figures trace to the reproducible model runs shown with each dataset.

More caught attacks from WaDi 2017Attack #10Attack #16All caught attacks

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