All caught attacksAttack walkthrough / evidence trace / WaDi 2017

Attack #162LIT002

Elevated-reservoir tank level transmitter. Attacker's intended impact: Stealthy attack.

Single Stage, Single PointWater Distribution10m 35s windowfirst catch 4m 43s1 of 1 engines flagged it
1.0Plant

Where it hit the plant

P1

primary grid, raw-water intake & dosing

P2

elevated reservoir, secondary distribution

2LIT002
P3

consumer / return network

2.0Timeline

Attack window and detections

Labelled window2017-07-11 15:26:30 to 2017-07-11 15:37:00plant local time
Physical Residual
4m 43s

Shaded band: the labelled attack window from the iTrust ground-truth catalog. Marks: the first second each engine flagged the window. "No flag" means the engine stayed silent for the whole window.

3.0Evidence

Why it was flagged

At 2017-07-11 15:26:30, attack #16 (SSSP) manipulated 2LIT002 — “Overflow of Elevated Reservoir tank”. The serving model raised the alert 283 seconds after onset (peak score 1.0596x the operating threshold). The dominant physical evidence: 2MV006 — motorized valve, Stage 2 (elevated reservoir — secondary distribution) was driven to a state the plant's learned physics did not predict from the rest of the process, carrying 7% of the anomaly score — 10.5x its share in normal operation. Supporting deviations were concentrated in 2P003, 2P003SPEED, 1AIT003. In plain terms: the plant's own physics stopped agreeing with what the sensors were reporting, in exactly the part of the process the attacker touched.

From the official explain run 2026-06-14T18:37:06Z
Peak score 1.06x of the operating threshold

Sensors carrying the anomaly score

SensorShare of scoreDeviationShare vs normal
2MV006
motorized valve, Stage 2 (elevated reservoir — secondary distribution)
6.6%5.5σ10.5x
2P003
pump, Stage 2 (elevated reservoir — secondary distribution)
6.5%5.3σ8.5x
2P003SPEED
pump, Stage 2 (elevated reservoir — secondary distribution)
5.0%4.1σ5.5x
1AIT003
water-quality analyzer, Stage 1 (primary grid — raw-water intake & dosing)
4.8%4.0σ2.7x
1AIT005
water-quality analyzer, Stage 1 (primary grid — raw-water intake & dosing)
3.9%3.2σ1.9x
2PIT001
pressure transmitter, Stage 2 (elevated reservoir — secondary distribution)
3.7%3.0σ3.0x
2_FIC_401_PV
plant instrument, Stage 2 (elevated reservoir — secondary distribution)
3.1%2.6σ5.1x
2_FIC_501_SP
plant instrument, Stage 2 (elevated reservoir — secondary distribution)
3.0%2.5σ1.5x
4.0Provenance

Every figure has a run.

Validation run

2026-06-13T22:27:18Z, commit de79dac5398150de9bc5eda89a529d2dbb942c6c

Model image

sha-de79dac53981

Metrics artefact SHA-256

a05be50d6a12ad442d292f0b9759d4087430c537fcc3b93712812ff55d5605bb

Explain run

2026-06-14T18:37:06Z

Explain artefact SHA-256

ce5f77ae0bc78a0576ec3ca053b5594844039f7f77c0aa2ba63850a9bf46874f

Generator

vardar-portal/scripts/build-gallery-data.mjs (DEL-34/DEL-43)

SWaT and WaDi datasets courtesy of iTrust, Centre for Research in Cyber Security, Singapore University of Technology and Design. Detection figures trace to the reproducible model runs shown with each dataset.

More caught attacks from WaDi 2017Attack #10Attack #2All caught attacks

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